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Abstract: Innovation requires more than technological expertise. It is a time 
consuming activity requiring access to a range of resources including finance. 
Yet, innovators involved in start-ups rarely have direct access to significant 
financial resources. Instead, they turn to a variety of forms of financial 
bootstrapping. Defined as access to resources not owned or controlled by the 
individual innovator, bootstrapping involves imaginative and parsimonious 
strategies for marshalling and gaining control of resources. This paper reports 
on research into bootstrapping using case studies, drawn from biographies of 
well-known innovators. The study found that bootstrapping was widespread 
and innovators showed great ingenuity in obtaining finance without recourse  
to conventional financial institutions. Not only were ranges of bootstrapping 
techniques employed, the study also provided valuable insights into the 
importance of social capital, in the form of networks of friends, colleagues and 
other contacts, in providing innovators with access to bootstrapping finance. 
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1 Introduction 
Very little of the literature on innovation is devoted to funding and financial aspects of 
innovation. The same is not true of entrepreneurship and business start-ups, where 
finance is normally dealt with in considerable detail. However, attention tends to focus  
on conventional institutional sources of start-up finance. Informal sources of finance  
such as business angels have until recently been relatively neglected. This is a recent 
development and other forms of internal finance have generally failed to attract attention. 
Unlike conventional forms of start-up finance, ‘bootstrapping’ has been subjected to very 
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limited scrutiny by academic researchers. As one of the few pieces of recent research into 
bootstrapping noted, ‘most references to bootstrapping occur in the ‘how to set up a 
business literature’ or are anecdotal in nature’ [Harrison et al., (2004), p.308]. 
The term ‘bootstrapping’ is used in a number of contexts to refer to success achieved 
through an individual’s own efforts [Harrison et al., (2004), p.310]. In the financial 
context, Bhide (1992, p.110) refers to bootstrapping as, ‘launching new ventures with 
modest personal funds’ and similarly, Winborg and Landström (2001, p.235) refer to 
‘methods for meeting the need for resources without relying on long-term external 
finance from debt holders and/or new owners’. While these definitions indicate what 
bootstrapping is not, they fail to adequately convey the nature and characteristics of this 
source of finance. Other studies have provided further precision. Freear et al. (1995, 
p.395) for instance define bootstrapping as, ‘highly creative ways of acquiring the use of 
resources without borrowing money or raising finance from traditional sources’, while 
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, p.24) describe bootstrapping as, ‘the highly 
creative acquisition and use of resources without raising equity from traditional sources 
and banks’. They go on to add that it is typically characterised by, ‘a high reliance on 
internally generated earnings, second mortgages, credit cards and customers advances’. 
In a similar vein, a recent study by Harrison et al. (2004, p.308) describes bootstrapping 
as, ‘imaginative and parsimonious strategies for marshalling and gaining control of 
resources’. This definition probably comes closest to accurately conveying the nature of 
bootstrapping because of the emphasis on personal initiative and ingenuity. It also 
identifies the two forms that bootstrapping typically takes, namely ways of acquiring 
finance that do not rely on conventional sources of finance and ways of minimising the 
need for finance in the first place. 
If we now know what bootstrapping is, why is it important in business start-up 
situations where innovation is taking place? The answer lies in the high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding start-ups which is compounded by the additional uncertainty 
associated with innovation. Under these circumstances, financial institutions are 
unwilling to provide financial resources. Allied to this is the risk of loss of control 
associated with external finance. This is generally a key issue for innovators who, having 
spent significant sums to protect their intellectual property rights, are often anxious not to 
see them diluted or lost to others. 
This study aims to contribute to our understanding of how innovations are funded. It 
focuses on innovations developed by individuals rather than corporations, specifically 
those associated with technology-based start-up situations. The study seeks to identify  
the range of bootstrapping techniques employed and the factors behind the selection  
of particular bootstrapping techniques. The link between social capital and particular 
bootstrapping techniques is also explored. 
2 The literature on financial bootstrapping 
Several researchers including Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) and Van Auken 
(2005) have highlighted the paucity of research studies into financial bootstrapping. 
Despite this, bootstrapping continues to be a topic that has attracted comparatively little 
research interest. One of the first studies to highlight this research gap was by Thorne 
(1989). Though he did not use the term bootstrapping, preferring the term ‘alternative 
financing’ instead, nonetheless, Thorne (1989) described a range of methods by which 
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business start-ups obtain resources including, borrowing from suppliers via late or 
deferred payments, deals with customers, ‘free’ or low cost labour, non-equity funds, and 
special relationships with institutions and individuals. It was exactly these sorts of 
methods that Bhide (1992) was referring to when he used the term ‘bootstrapping’ to 
describe the informal ways in which entrepreneurs acquire financial resources. 
The decade or so since Bhide’s (1992) paper has been marked by a steadily increasing 
number of research studies into financial bootstrapping (Freear et al., 1995; Van Auken 
and Neeley, 1996; Winborg and Landström, 1997; Carter et al., 2003; Harrison et al., 
2004; Van Auken, 2005; Brush et al., 2006). Significantly, these studies have focused not 
just on business start-ups, but on technology-based business start-ups which by their 
nature have involved innovation. Hence, a somewhat limited picture is beginning to 
emerge of how innovation is funded when undertaken by business start-ups. These 
studies have generally been small-scale, both Freear et al. (1995) and Van Auken (2005) 
for instance employing less than 100 respondents, while that of Winborg and Landström 
(1997) involved just over 250. It is also the case that the studies have been predominantly 
US based (Freear et al., 1995; Van Auken, 2005; Carter et al., 2003; Brush et al., 2006). 
Only one study, by Harrison et al. (2004), was undertaken in the UK. Although they have 
focused on technology-based start-ups, the context has been somewhat narrow with 
several of the studies confined to the software industry. 
Similarly, they have adopted a relatively narrow methodological stance, with a heavy 
reliance on questionnaire based surveys. As a result, the research has been largely 
descriptive, identifying the bootstrapping techniques employed at a particular point in the 
development of a new venture. Only one study (Van Auken, 2005) goes as far as 
attempting some form of classification of bootstrapping techniques. Harrison et al.  
(2004, p.328) note that the descriptive nature of much of this research has meant that we 
know little about the ‘process dynamics’ associated with bootstrapping. Reliance on 
questionnaire based surveys has also meant that there has been little scope for exploring 
the role of bootstrapping techniques in general or the relationship between the techniques 
employed and other facets of business start-ups such as social capital. Interestingly, one 
study by Winborg and Landström (1997), while based primarily on a questionnaire 
survey, does include almost incidentally a short case study. The case study not only 
reveals the bootstrapping techniques employed, but also provides a valuable insight  
into the context leading to the selection of particular bootstrapping techniques  
and highlights the importance of relationships to the acquisition of resources in 
technology-based start-ups. 
The studies that have taken place to date have been fairly modest in their findings 
reflecting the exploratory and descriptive nature of what little research has taken place. It 
is clear that financial bootstrapping techniques are common and widely used in business 
start-ups, whether technology-based or not. Just how widespread is evident from the 
studies by Freear et al. (1995) and Harrison et al. (2004, p.318) which reported that the 
proportions of respondents that used at least one method of bootstrapping were 90% and 
95% respectively. Studies have also shown that bootstrapping is very much a feature of 
the early stages of venture development [Harrison et al., (2004), p.307] and covers a wide 
variety of techniques. Freear et al. (1995) found evidence of a total of 32 bootstrapping 
methods in use, while in the studies by Van Auken (2005) and Harrison et al. (2004), the 
numbers were only slightly less at 28 and 31 respectively. The sheer number of 
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techniques led Harrison et al. (2004) to conclude that bootstrapping is an imprecise 
construct. 
Despite the apparent plethora of techniques covered by the term financial 
bootstrapping, it is evident that firms actually rely on a small number of methods 
[Harrison et al., (2004), p.322]. A theme that emerges from several of the studies is the 
importance of relationships to the effective use of bootstrapping techniques. Freear et al. 
(1995, p.405) describe relationships and customers as being of ‘considerable importance’, 
a view echoed by Harrison et al. (2004, p.321) who describe relationships as ‘critical’ to 
successful start-ups. Harrison et al. (2004, p.321) go on briefly to explore why this is the 
case, noting that social capital in the form of personal networks is, ‘a prerequisite for the 
successful exploitation of these bootstrapping techniques’. However, they note that the 
key in understanding the role that networks play lies in the ‘process dynamics’ associated 
with business start-ups, something which is unfortunately beyond the scope of their 
study. Another study that placed considerable emphasis upon the importance of social 
capital was that undertaken by Carter et al. (2003). However, while this study provided 
valuable insights into the nature of social capital [Carter et al., (2003), p.6], because it 
focused primarily on access to equity capital, unfortunately, it shed little light on the use 
of bootstrapping. 
3 Methodology 
Given that earlier studies have noted the importance of relationships and social capital in 
understanding financial bootstrapping, this study seeks to explore both of these aspects, 
but from the perspective of what Harrison et al. (2004, p.321) term ‘process dynamics’. 
In order to get at these dynamics, something other than the survey approach used in most 
studies of bootstrapping to date is required. In particular, it is necessary to examine the 
context in which bootstrapping techniques are employed. Since the context changes over 
time, this points to a longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional research design and one 
way in which this can be achieved is through the use of case study research, which can be 
particularly effective in showing how the context influences the decision-making process. 
Case studies provide scope for a detailed in-depth examination of the funding process 
and in this study, three case studies are employed, each based on a technology-based 
start-up. The start-ups are Lotus Cars, Oxford Instruments and Dyson Appliances. Each 
came about through the efforts of a single innovator; hence, they are examples of what 
Jones and Conway (2004, p.87) term the ‘heroic’ model of innovation, where an 
individual develops an innovative new product and then builds a successful business 
around it. In this instance, the innovations were lightweight sports cars, superconducting 
magnets and the bagless vacuum cleaner, and the respective innovators, Colin Chapman, 
Martin Wood and James Dyson. Because they created highly successful businesses and 
over time became relatively well-known, there is a substantial amount of documentary 
material, in particular, biographies and business histories covering the individuals  
and their innovations. For this study, two biographies were used, Gerard Crombac’s 
biography of Colin Chapman (Crombac, 2001) and James Dyson’s autobiography 
Against the Odds (Dyson, 1997), together with Audrey Wood’s business history of 
Oxford Instruments (Wood, 2001), the company created by Martin Wood. The latter 
comes very close to being a biography. Written by Martin Wood’s wife who was one of 
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the co-founders of Oxford Instruments, it provides a detailed first hand account of the 
venture, very much in the style of a biography. 
Although the use of biographies as a major data source for case studies is 
comparatively rare in management research, Roberts (2002) notes that biographical 
research is used in many disciplines. In the context of management research, Jones and 
Conway (2004, p.89) observe that autobiographies as ‘first hand accounts’ are no less 
valid than in-depth interviews. Similarly, Bryman and Bell (2003, p.406) identify 
biographies as a potential data source for management researchers citing studies of 
General Motors (Martin and Siehl, 1983) and Disney (Bryman, 1995). While they note 
that biographies have to be treated with caution as they may be exercises in reputation 
building, nonetheless, they suggest that quotations, stories and what they term ‘snippets’ 
[Bryman and Bell, (2003), p.406] can be valuable in building case studies. 
4 Case studies 
4.1 Lotus 
Colin Chapman was one of the most innovative car designers of the post-war era. Among 
a string of innovations that he produced were a series of lightweight sports cars in the 
1950s and when he moved into Formula One motor racing in the 1960s, he created the 
Lotus 25, the first monocoque construction Formula One car that dispensed with the need 
for a separate chassis. It was not only a highly successful design that brought Lotus the 
Formula One world championship, it forms the basis of Formula One car design to this 
day. 
Lotus was founded in 1952 by Colin Chapman with £25 borrowed from his fiancée 
Hazel Williams [Crombac, (2001), p.35]. Chapman at this time was employed by the 
British Aluminium Company as a structural engineer and he worked for Lotus in the 
evenings and at weekends. The company’s first premises were former stables leased at a 
very modest rent from Chapman’s father who owned the pub next door [Crombac, 
(2001), p.34]. This was not the only financial help that Chapman received from his father. 
Three years later, Chapman senior purchased an adjoining piece of land and loaned it to 
the company to enable the premises to be extended. When by 1959 the growth of  
the company meant that even these premises were insufficient, it was Chapman senior 
who purchased an entirely new site in Cheshunt on which a purpose built factory was 
constructed. 
Colin Chapman was helped in his new venture by a group of volunteers. Most, like 
Mike Costin who went on to found the engine manufacturer Cosworth, worked for 
nothing but the promise that they would occasionally get to drive the cars built by the 
company [Crombac, (2001), p.53]. Lacking much in the way of equipment, Chapman 
subcontracted the manufacture of the aluminium body of his first sports cars to Williams 
and Pritchard [Lawrence, (2002), p.40], a small engineering firm also based in North 
London. Such was the state of Lotus’s finances that it was not unusual for Williams and 
Pritchard to have to chase Chapman in order to get their invoices paid [Lawrence, (2002), 
p.41]. 
During the early years, the fledgling Lotus Company benefited from relationships 
with a variety of institutions. In the early stages, the 750 Motor Club was particularly 
important. Chapman was a member of the club and participated in many races organised 
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by it. Many of the acquaintances that Chapman made through the club were customers 
for early Lotus sports cars including Gerard Crombac himself. However, not all 
Chapman’s 750 Motor Club customers paid cash, for Lotus was prepared to barter its 
products in exchange for services [Crombac, (2001), p.35] as when one Patrick Stephens 
handled Lotus’s advertising in exchange for components for his car. Another important 
institution in the early years was the aircraft manufacturer De Havilland based near to 
Lotus at Hatfield. Several De Havilland employees, such as Mike Costin [Crombac, 
(2001), p.42] worked for Lotus in the evenings and at weekends and it was through them 
that Lotus gained unofficial access to the plane maker’s wind tunnel for prototype testing. 
By 1955, with expanded premises and a healthy order book, Lotus was sufficiently 
well established for Colin Chapman to give up his day job at British Aluminium and 
work at Lotus full time. By 1959, continued expansion meant a move to new premises as 
the company began production of the Lotus Elite sports car, an innovative design that 
made extensive use of glass fibre. By this time, Lotus was a recognised car manufacturer, 
albeit on a small-scale and two years later, Chapman began to work on his most 
significant innovation, the Lotus 25 Formula One car. 
4.2 Oxford Instruments 
Martin Wood has been described as ‘the pioneer of the Oxford entrepreneurial 
revolution’ [Hague and Holmes, (2006), p.1]. He and his wife Audrey founded Oxford 
Instruments in 1959 with £200 of their own money. They began producing equipment for 
research laboratories and pioneered the development of superconducting magnets. At the 
time, Martin Wood worked for Oxford University as a senior research officer at the 
Clarendon Laboratory [Wood, (2001), p.4], a leading centre for research into magnetic 
fields. The main purpose of the new company was the construction of electro-magnets for 
universities and other bodies establishing similar laboratory facilities. The company’s 
premises were initially the garden shed at the Wood’s home in Oxford. What little 
equipment the company needed was generally borrowed from the university and its only 
employee was a retired laboratory technician from the Clarendon Laboratory who worked 
part time. Among the company’s first customers were research laboratories at Malvern 
and Harwell that Martin Wood knew through his work at the university. However, not 
long after Oxford Instruments had been established, Martin Wood, while attending a 
conference in the US as part of his work for the university, became aware of new 
research into superconducting magnets – which were able to generate magnetic fields 
higher than anything seen before while using much less electrical power. Learning of 
these developments, Martin Wood set out to make one of these new magnets for himself. 
Using Oxford University’s computer, Wood was able to design a superconducting 
magnet. To make it, Wood ordered a small quantity of nobium zirconium wire and 
borrowed a winding machine from the Clarendon Laboratory together with a glass 
cryostat containing liquid helium – essential to cool the magnet and give it 
superconducting properties. Early in 1962, Oxford Instruments was able to demonstrate 
the first superconducting magnet outside the US [Wood, (2001), p.23]. 
Wood described his new magnet in an article in the New Scientist and demonstrated it 
at a number of exhibitions including one organised by the Physical Society [Wood, 
(2001), p.24]. These generated much interest and Oxford Instruments gained its first  
two contracts to design and build superconducting magnets. By now, the company had 
acquired larger premises in the form of former stables in Oxford and some second-hand 
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manufacturing equipment including an old lathe bought at auction [Wood, (2001), p.11] 
and early in 1963, the company delivered its first superconducting magnet. In the same 
year, the company also acquired its first full time employee [Wood, (2001), p.28], while 
Martin Wood’s wife Audrey handled the paperwork. As yet, the new company’s financial 
needs had been met by the Wood’s themselves supplemented by loans from family 
members [Wood, (2001), p.31]. 
During the 1960s, Oxford Instruments pioneered the development and supply of 
superconducting magnets in Europe and the company grew rapidly. It soon outgrew  
the old stables and moved into a former laundry. Having initially purchased supplies of 
liquid helium from the Clarendon Laboratory, this soon proved an inadequate source of 
supply and unable to obtain sufficient liquid helium from commercial sources, Oxford 
Instruments formed a subsidiary to produce its own supply. The increased availability of 
liquid helium nationally led to a surge in orders for superconducting magnets. By 
September 1965, the company had a turnover of £94,000 [Wood, (2001), p.39] and  
25 full time employees, but the only external funding was an overdraft from the bank and 
Martin Wood was still working full time for Oxford University, though the company had 
appointed a managing director to provide day-to-day control over the business. 
4.3 Dyson 
James Dyson is the inventor of the ‘bagless’ vacuum cleaner. Launched in July 1993, in a 
little over two years, the ‘dual cyclone’ vacuum cleaner produced by his company Dyson 
Appliances had become the UK’s best selling vacuum cleaner [Dyson, (1997), p.225]. 
However, successful innovation did not come easily. Dyson was a graduate of the Royal 
College of Art who had worked on a number of innovations before he became interested 
in vacuum cleaners. He worked for an entrepreneur, Jeremy Fry developing a new form 
of boat, before deciding to branch out on his own to develop a new type of wheelbarrow. 
Called the ‘ballbarrow’, Dyson set up his own manufacturing company in a venture with 
his brother-in-law in the 1970s [Dyson, (1997), p.79] in order to produce it. Despite a 
lack of business knowledge, this innovation proved remarkably successful. It was this 
venture that indirectly led to Dyson’s interest in vacuum cleaners. While instaling dust 
extraction equipment at the ballbarrow plant, he had the idea of applying the same 
principle behind the industrial dust extractor to a vacuum cleaner. Unable to persuade his 
fellow directors, Dyson left to set up a new venture. This time, he went into partnership 
with his former boss Jeremy Fry, raising his own share through selling part of his garden 
and mortgaging his house, in order to set up the Air Power Vacuum Cleaner Company. 
Building prototypes in his garage at home, it took Dyson three years to develop and 
patent an effective prototype, during which time, he was supported by his family. By this 
time, he was further in debt so to re-coup his investment as rapidly as possible, he tried to 
licence his ‘dual cyclone’ technology. 
Unable to persuade the major vacuum cleaner manufacturers in Europe and the US to 
take out a licence, Dyson eventually turned to Japan and after three years of trying, a 
Japanese company eventually decided to take up a licence. Developed as a highly priced 
cleaner called the G-Force [Dyson, (1997), p.162] specifically for the Japanese market, it 
achieved a modest degree of success and was followed by a similar deal with a Canadian 
company, but Dyson was plagued by litigation involving would-be licencees. Though the 
income from licences enabled Dyson to clear his debts and even employ a small staff of 
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his own, it was not until 1991 when the litigation was finally settled that Dyson was able 
to turn his attention to the home market (Dyson, 1997). With his technology proven and a 
favourable response from consumers [Dyson, (1997), p.188] courtesy of his licence deals, 
Dyson chose to set up on his own. However, unable to obtain capital from merchant 
banks or government agencies, he turned to his family again and they agreed to him 
mortgaging both the family homes to raise £600,000. By 1993, everything was in place 
and in July of that year, the Dyson DC01 bagless vacuum cleaner went on sale in the UK. 
5 Case analysis 
All three cases are examples of technology-based start-ups and in each instance, financial 
bootstrapping techniques are much in evidence in the early stages of the venture. The 
bootstrapping techniques used were the same or similar to those found in earlier studies, 
although not unsurprisingly the software specific techniques found in studies undertaken 
in the software industry such as that by Freear et al. (1995) were not in evidence. Using 
the categories of bootstrapping identified by Thorne (1989), Table 1 gives an overview of 
the bootstrapping techniques found in the three case studies. 
Borrowing from suppliers and service providers was evident in all three cases, but 
took a variety of different forms. Chapman was notorious for borrowing from suppliers 
by delaying payment and suppliers in turn on occasions resorted to re-possessing items 
they had supplied [Crombac, (2001), p.44]. Dyson on the other hand thrashed out a  
deal with the firm that made the tooling for the ballbarrow whereby he paid them in 
instalments [Dyson, (1997), p.186]. However, it is also striking that in two out of the 
three cases, this was not the only form of borrowing. Chapman borrowed equipment such 
as De Havilland’s wind tunnel, while Wood borrowed a variety of forms of equipment 
including a computer, a winding machine and cryostats from his employer, Oxford 
University. 
Table 1 Bootstrapping techniques in use 
Bootstrapping categories Lotus Oxford Instruments Dyson 
Borrowing from suppliers * * * 
Deals with customers *   
‘Free’ or low cost labour * * * 
Special deals for space * * * 
Non-equity funds    
Special relationships * * * 
Other * *  
Source: Case studies 
Deals with customers, as the Lotus case shows, were something that Chapman made 
extensive use of, mainly in the form of taking payment in kind. That the others did not 
use this technique was probably a function of the markets they served, where there 
simply was not scope for deals with individual customers. Free or low cost labour on the 
other hand was much in evidence in all three cases. The sources of such labour were 
varied. All three innovators used their wives as a source of free labour and in the case of 
both Lotus and Oxford Instruments, their roles were not insignificant as they had 
P
oo
f
py
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Financial bootstrapping and social capital 9    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
responsibility for administrative matters. Martin Wood was also able to draw on retired 
technicians from the Clarendon Laboratory, while Colin Chapman drew on a band of 
unpaid volunteers recruited mainly through the 750 Motor Club. Special deals for space 
also cropped up in all three cases, though the nature of the deals varied. Colin Chapman 
had the use of a stable building behind his father’s pub at a low rent, while Martin Wood 
started in his garden shed and James Dyson used the outbuildings of his home near  
bath. They may not have begun in garages, as in Silicon Valley where many innovative 
high-tech businesses, including Hewlett-Packard and Apple Computer, began in garages 
[Audia and Rider, (2005), p.6], but all three of the case study companies used something 
very similar. Thorne’s category of non-equity funds covers funding obtained from 
government agencies at national, regional or local levels. Interestingly, not one of the 
cases studies documents any of the innovators gaining funding of this sort. This may well 
be a contextual factor. All three of the case studies are UK based and certainly at the time 
when two of the three cases took place, government agencies in the UK, particularly at 
the local and regional level, did not provide financial support for innovation. 
Special relationships, the sixth form of bootstrapping, were much used in evidence in 
all three cases and the nature of the relationships provides a valuable perspective on  
the importance of social capital for start-ups. It was particularly striking that these 
relationships, which constituted the personal networks of the innovators, were derived 
from different institutions. Some were family-based, some were university-based, some 
were industry-based and some were based on social activities. All three innovators had 
middle class backgrounds and it is striking that family relationships, including parents 
and in-laws, were an important source of funding. Thus, Colin Chapman’s father who 
was a publican provided his son with premises at a below market rent, Martin Wood’s 
parents who had a professional background provided loans, while James Dyson, whose 
father was a teacher but who died while he was a boy, gained financial support from his 
brother-in-law. 
While all three innovators were graduates, it was in fact only Martin Wood and James 
Dyson who appeared to have benefited from university contacts. In Martin Wood’s case, 
university contacts provided both suppliers and customers as well as access to knowledge 
and expertise about the technology that he was using. In James Dyson’s case, it was 
contacts generated through the Royal College of Art where he had been a student that 
provided him with a partner when he set out to develop his cyclone technology as well as 
employees at a later stage [Jones and Conway, (2004), p.98]. Industry-based networks 
were also shown to be important in at least two of the cases. Colin Chapman benefited 
from being located near to the aircraft manufacturer De Havilland, which provided him 
with skilled volunteers as well as access to wind tunnel facilities. In Dyson’s case, it  
was industrial contacts made while developing the ballbarrow that provided him with 
component suppliers for his vacuum cleaner [Dyson, (1997), p.186; Jones and Conway, 
(2004), p.98]. Finally, the category of ‘other methods’ includes a few additional forms of 
bootstrapping. Both Chapman and Wood used second-hand equipment bought at auction 
as well as relying heavily on evening and weekend working. Indeed, it is significant that 
two of the three innovators did not quit their day jobs until their start-ups were very well 
established. Pr
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6 Conclusions 
This study provides further evidence that financial bootstrapping techniques are an 
essential feature of business start-ups, particularly ones based around technological 
innovation. The cases not only show that many of the bootstrapping techniques identified 
in earlier survey research are widely used in practice, but they also show in some detail 
how and why they are used. In so doing, they shed some light on what Harrison et al. 
(2004) describe as the ‘process dynamics’ surrounding the use of bootstrapping 
techniques. However, perhaps the most significant contribution of this study is the insight 
that it provides into the nature and importance of the personal networks, comprising 
friends, colleagues and other contacts, which play a crucial role in providing the 
innovator with access to many of the bootstrapping techniques. The case studies show 
that these are not confined to ‘special relationships’, for other bootstrapping techniques, 
notably borrowing from suppliers and others and free/low cost labour, were also 
dependent on personal networks. Burt (1992) and others (Sørheim, 2003) have shown 
how these networks constitute ‘social capital’ through which individuals access 
resources. The cases in turn show that this is very much the case with start-ups based on 
innovation, where innovators’ social capital is a key feature of their ability to access 
financial resources based on bootstrapping techniques. 
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